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Rayna Keshavjee, Vice President

Overview

Pennsylvania anti-usury laws cap interest rates at around 6% for most loans below $50,000.¹ These limits tend to bar people without a high credit score, substantial collateral, or financial stability from borrowing because creditors will not lend them money. To work around this, many Pennsylvania residents have crossed state lines, despite facing extremely high interest rates, in order to borrow money. In this case, citizens of Pennsylvania go to TitleMax, which is a car loan company. TitleMax does not have brick-and-mortar stores or ads in Pennsylvania, nor are they incorporated there.


Allegedly, TitleMax was providing loans with interest rates as high as 180%.² By serving citizens of Pennsylvania, TitleMax records liens through Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation, repossesses cars registered in Pennsylvania, and accepts payments made from Pennsylvania. However, TitleMax has seemingly no obligation to comply with Pennsylvania’s interest rate limits. Consequently, Pennsylvania issued a subpoena for TitleMax’s records because the state was investigating whether TitleMax illegally issued loans to Pennsylvania residents at interest rates exceeding the state’s legal caps. TitleMax refused the subpoena on the grounds that Pennsylvania could not apply their laws to an out-of-state lender because that would violate the dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states from passing legislation that excessively burdens interstate commerce. The lower court initially ruled in favor of TitleMax, but the U.S Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit ruled that Pennsylvania did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that the state law did not have extraterritorial reach because TitleMax's transactions were not conducted entirely outside Pennsylvania. The court also found that the laws did not discriminate against out-of-stater lenders. Finally, the court concluded that Pennsylvania had a legitimate interest in protecting its residents from predatory lending and that any burden on interstate commerce was, at most, incidental compared to the state interest.


Significance

This decision resulted in a federal circuit split. In Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, the U.S Court of Appeals 7th Circuit previously ruled that Indiana could not apply its credit laws to an out-of-state lender because the loan was physically executed across state lines. The 3rd Circuit rejected that approach in TitleMax, creating uncertainty over when a state may regulate an out-of-state lender whose customers live in that state. The Supreme Court declined to resolve the split when it denied TitleMax's petition for certiorari in 2022.

Furthermore, this decision strengthens the regulatory power of states. Before, the practice of setting up physical storefronts merely outside state lines was relatively common. However, with the TitleMax decision, states are able to penalize out-of-state companies for targeting their residents as a workaround of states’ interest rate caps. 

These implications may extend to fintech and online lending. In the digital economy, the TitleMax decision strips a company’s immunity from state interest rate caps for the mere reason of servers and offices being located in a different state. Instead, this holding provides justification for requiring the digital economy to comply with the laws of where their customers are, rather than only where the company itself is present. 

¹  TitleMax of Delaware, Inc. v. Weissmann, 24 F.4th 230 (3d Cir. 2022).

²  TitleMax, 24 F.4th at 234.



 
 
 

Elif Painaik, Co-Editor in Chief

Overview

In Cascino v. Nelson, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a Texas law that only allows voters over age 65 to vote by mail violates the 26th Amendment’s prohibition of age-based discrimination in voting.¹ The case was filed during the COVID-19 pandemic by 20-year-old UT Austin student Joseph Cascino, who argued that voting by mail should be accessible to people of all ages. Currently, voting by mail is legal in Texas for those under 65 only if they are sick or disabled, expecting a baby within 3 weeks of Election Day, currently imprisoned, or have a demonstrable reason to be out of the state during all days of early voting and Election Day.² Because of this, many voters had to vote in person during the pandemic, putting their personal health at risk. Meanwhile, citizens over 65 could vote by mail without restriction. Cascino was successful at the District Court level, but struck down at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declined to resolve it.


Significance

Cascino v. Nelson was a critical case for age-based voting rights, testing a provision of the 26th Amendment that has never been tested before nor since. However, the COVID-19 pandemic serves as an example of a situation where voting by mail is necessary for those who do not currently qualify. The plaintiff noted in an interview that the 26th Amendment states that the right to vote for voters 18+ “‘shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.’" Therefore, a law restricting the ability of voters to vote by mail should not be determined by age. Many advocates liken it to denying mail-in voting on the basis of someone’s race. This case tests how extensive the 26th Amendment's protection against discrimination is–is the right to vote itself enough, or do the methods and rules of voting need to be the same for everyone? If the latter is the case, that may open more questions about voting rights, such as for convicted felons. This case could also set significant precedent for other age-related questions outside of voting rights, and potentially test existing legislation against age-based discrimination. 


Policy Solutions

The Fifth Circuit should have ruled in favor of Cascino. Limiting the age at which people can access methods of voting violates the 26th Amendment by limiting the rights of those under 65 to vote by mail without a “valid” reason. As Cascino noted, the Texas legislature and other state legislatures must amend Elections Code to allow any eligible voter to apply for and receive a mail ballot. Such a change would ensure that voting methods are not unnecessarily restricted based on age. This would better uphold the constitutional guarantee that the right to vote cannot be denied or abridged on account of age. Expanding access to mail voting would therefore represent not only a practical reform, but also an important step toward ensuring that the constitutional right to vote is meaningfully protected for all eligible voters, regardless of age. 


 ¹ Constitutional Accountability Center, Cascino v. Nelson, https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/cascino-v-nelson/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2026). 

 ² Tex. Sec'y of State, Voting by Mail: Eligibility Requirements, https://www.votetexas.gov/voting-by-mail/eligibility-requirements.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2026). 



 
 
 

Elif Painaik, Co-Editor in Chief

Overview

In Chatrie vs. United States, the Supreme Court is currently considering whether the execution of a geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.¹ A geofence warrant is a legal court order that compels technology companies to provide data on every electronic device present within a specific geographic area during a designated time frame. This allows police to scan thousands of devices, even those of innocent bystanders. Unlike traditional warrants that target a specific, known suspect, police use geofence warrants when the perpetrator's identity is initially unknown.² Okello Chatrie, the petitioner who was convicted partially based on one of these warrants, is arguing that these warrants violated his Fourth Amendment right to unreasonable search and seizure and impeded on privacy.


Significance

With rapid technological developments such as geofencing, questions of privacy are increasingly relevant to the Supreme Court and to the legal system as a whole, and more specific legislative regulation is needed to ensure that law enforcement does not use technology to violate constitutional rights. Warrants such as these often turn

innocent passersby into suspects, and Harvard Law Review writes that they have effectively “obliterated the utility of probable cause as a meaningful standard for balancing privacy interests against law enforcement needs.”³ Besides invading everyday privacy, geofence warrants may have a chilling effect on civil liberties–they may inadvertently catch people at rallies or political demonstrations, religious services, reproductive health clinics, and other events people may not want others to know they are at for personal reasons. This may lead

them to change their behavior in anticipation of surveillance, like not attending events they otherwise would have. Finally, technological issues with location accuracy may mean false convictions – such as if people are “seen” through geofencing in locations they actually weren’t in – or inaccuracies in the prosecuting process.


Policy Solutions

The Supreme Court should rule in favor of Chatrie. The geofence warrant used in his case violated the Fourth Amendment by authorizing the collection of location data from every Google user within a broad area over a one-hour period, regardless of any individualized suspicion. Investigators initially obtained anonymized

location data for dozens of devices and then narrowed the list until they identified Chatrie's device, with no probable cause linking Chatrie to the robbery. This approach resembles the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit. Legislatures must prohibit law enforcement and investigators from using

geofence warrants to acquire data on everyone who was merely near a crime scene. Instead, lawmakers should require warrants to be narrowly tailored, supported by individualized probable cause, and subject to strict judicial oversight. Such reforms would allow law enforcement to continue utilizing technological tools while protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties of innocent individuals.


 ¹ SCOTUSblog, “Chatrie v. United States,” accessed June 22, 2026, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/chatrie-v-united-states/. 

 ² Joanna R. Lampe, “Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment,” Congressional Research Service, Legal Sidebar LSB11274, updated January 22, 2026, accessed June 22, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11274. 

³ Jackie O’Neil, Much Ado About Geofence Warrants, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Feb. 18, 2025), https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2025/02/much-ado-about-geofence-warrants/.



 
 
 

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